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1. Introduction 
The literature on moral responsibility is ripe with accounts of what it takes for an agent to 
become blameworthy. Typically, a responsibility theorist will say that the agent must act 
wrongly and display an objectionable quality of will. Moreover, she must have generated this 
action, attitude, or omission knowingly, voluntary, and under control. When this happens, she 
is worthy of blame. But for how long? Very little is written about what it takes for an agent’s 
blameworthiness to cease or diminish.1  
One reason for the lack of interest in this question might be that most philosophers share 
the assumption that blameworthiness is forever: Once you’re blameworthy for something, 
you’re always blameworthy for that thing.2 But it is by no means obvious why this should be 
the case. Most philosophers working on moral responsibility also accept that an agent is 
blameworthy for something if and only if it is appropriate to blame her for that thing. This 
generic biconditional entails that if blaming S for x is no longer appropriate, then S is no longer 
blameworthy for x. Suppose that blame is equated with the reactive attitudes resentment, 
indignation, and guilt. The question of whether an agent remains blameworthy then boils down 
to the question of whether resentment, indignation and guilt remain appropriate. Once we frame 
the question in this way, there seem to be reasons to doubt that blameworthiness is forever. The 
diminution of blame, towards oneself, as well as towards other people, is a familiar 
phenomenon. The intense and painful guilt we might feel in the hours, days and weeks after we 
have done something wrong rarely persist. Similarly, resentment or indignation can change and 
disappear in time. Of course, many of the reasons for why blame diminishes seem to have little 
to do with the agent’s blameworthiness. It would be puzzling if the mere passage of time could 
                                                          
1 Notable exceptions are Tognazzini (2010), Coleman and Sarch (2012), Khoury and Matheson (2018) and Clarke 
(manuscript). Shoemaker (forthcoming) provides an interesting and relevant discussion, although the paper is 
framed in terms of forgiveness rather than blameworthiness. Callard (2018) and Marusic (2020) provide interesting 
discussions of the rationality of anger over time, without linking this discussion to blameworthiness.  
2 Randolph Clarke (manuscript) call this “the standard view.” 
render an agent less blameworthy for what he has done.  A victim might decide to let go of 
blame because he needed to move on with his life. Such prudential reasons might outweigh 
other reasons the victim has for continuing to blame the wrongdoer. But it would not make the 
agent any less blameworthy.  
However, there seems to be certain things a victim or a wrongdoer can feel or do that 
might change the wrongdoer’s status as blameworthy. A wrongdoer might experience guilt, 
atone, apologize and make reparations. A victim might forgive. Such actions and emotions seem 
to be reasons for why the victim should stop feeling resentment, or at least for resentment to 
diminish and for why the wrongdoer should stop feeling guilt for their action, or at least for 
guilt to diminish. Moreover, these reasons seem relevant to the agent’s blameworthiness, and 
not merely to the overall justification of continued blame.  
My aim in this paper is to answer the question of how and why blameworthiness can 
cease or diminish. In order to investigate this question, we need to consider what it is to be 
blameworthy. I will begin by discussing several ways in which a theory which understands 
blameworthiness in terms of the fittingness of resentment and indignation might attempt to 
answer this question. I will argue that all of the most plausible candidates face serious 
difficulties (sections 3 – 5). The problem is that it is very hard to develop a view of the 
representational content of blame that can account for the ways in which, intuitively, 
blameworthiness might diminish or disappear. The solution, I will argue, is to adopt a different 
account of blameworthiness, which does not rely merely on the fittingness of other-directed 
blame, but rather on the desert of self-directed blame. If we understand blameworthiness in 
terms of deserved guilt, we can give a plausible account of how blameworthiness can change 
over time. In section 6 and 7 I present this account. The thesis I will defend is this: whether an 
agent remains blameworthy will depend of whether she has experienced the guilt she deserved 
to feel for her action, attitude or omission. 
  
2. Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes 
The starting point for my discussion is the following, commonly accepted, generic 
biconditional:  
 
Blameworthiness: An agent S is blameworthy for X iff it is appropriate to blame S for X.3  
                                                          
3 See for example: Wallace (1994), Fischer and Ravizza (1998), McKenna (2012), Brink and Nelkin (2013), 
Pereboom (2014), Rosen (2015), Shoemaker (2015), and Menges (2017).  
 
However, sometimes we use the word “blameworthiness” in a different way. We talk of an 
agent being guilty of a wrongdoing, meaning simply that S did some wrongful action X at some 
point t and that they satisfied the control and knowledge conditions for being morally 
responsible for X at t. No matter what happens after, it remains the case that the agent did x 
under certain conditions. In this sense, it will remain true that they are guilty of the wrongdoing.4 
Note however that this conception of blameworthiness does not say anything about how we 
should treat or feel towards agents who are blameworthy in this sense.  Consider an analogy.5 
An offender who serves his time is nevertheless still guilty of his crime. It will remain true that 
he has committed the crime, acting with the relevant capacities. However, it would no longer 
be appropriate to keep him in prison. After all, he has gotten what he deserved.  Whereas 
punishment was appropriate when he was sentenced, it no longer is when he has served his 
time. Similarly, although a culpable wrongdoer will always remain guilty of his wrongdoing, it 
is by no means obvious whether it will always be appropriate to blame him for his wrongdoing. 
What gives the debate about moral blameworthiness its urgency is the question of whether our 
practices of feeling and expressing blame are appropriate at a particular time. Therefore, I will 
be concerned with blameworthiness in the sense that is identified by the appropriateness of 
blame, and not with blameworthiness in sense of being guilty of a wrongdoing.6  
The accounts of blameworthiness I will focus on in this paper understand blame as an 
emotion.7 It is typically understood either as resentment or indignation (Hieronymi 2001; 
Graham 2014; Menges 2017; Strabbing 2018). Appropriateness is understood as fittingness. 
Emotions are commonly taken to represent their objects has having evaluative properties. Envy 
portrays one’s rival as having something that one lacks, and casts this circumstance in a negative 
light. Regret represents one’s action as a mistake. Emotions are fitting only when such 
representations are correct or accurate. As D’Arms and Jacobson (2000: 72) put it, [i]n this 
respect, “the fittingness of an emotion is like the truth of a belief.” This conception of fittingness 
                                                          
4 Khoury  and Matheson (2018:207) call this the trivial sense of blameworthiness, since it follows trivially from 
the fixity of the past.  
5 I borrow this analogy from Clarke (manuscript) who argues that blameworthiness ought to be understood 
analogous to legal guilt rather than analogous to the appropriateness of punishment.   
6 Thanks to Michael McKenna for pressing me on this point 
7 I will also focus on moral blameworthiness as accountability in this paper. For discussions of other kinds of 
blameworthiness, see Watson (2004), Shoemaker (2015), and Carlsson (2019) 
is sometimes called “alethic”. (Rosen 2015)8Once we specify the relevant notions of blame and 
appropriateness, we get the following account of blame:  
 
Blameworthiness as fitting resentment: An agent S is blameworthy for X iff it is fitting to 
resent S for X. (Hieronymi 2001; Graham 2014; Strabbing 2018) 9   
 
According to Blameworthiness as fitting resentment, an agent is blameworthy to the extent 
that resentment is fitting. Whether blame is fitting will thus depend on what resentment 
represents. Different views give different accounts of the representational content of blame. 
Graham (2014), for example, takes resentment to be constituted only by a thought about the 
wrongdoer’s insufficiently good will.10 Strabbing (2018) adds to that a thought about the 
wrongdoer’s capacity to have acted better than she did. Such differences will yield different 
accounts of the conditions of blameworthiness.  
However, to answer the question of whether blameworthiness can change over time, we 
also need to know how these thoughts are indexed to time.11 Does resentment represent the 
wrongdoer’s quality of will or capacity to act better at the time of the wrongful action, or does 
it rather represent these attributes at the moment of blaming?  
 
3. Resentment Indexed to the Past 
Let us begin with the first option. Although few accounts have addressed this issue explicitly, 
it is possible to draw conclusions from how the representational content is formulated by 
different philosophers. Graham writes: “the content of a blame emotion felt toward a person for 
phi-ing is that, in phi-ing, that person has violated a moral requirement of respect.” (Graham 
2014: 408, my italics). Similarly, Strabbing defines the two constitutive thoughts as follows: 
“(1) In doing A, S expressed insufficient good will (toward me), (2) S could have done better.” 
(2018: 3136, my italics). Both of these formulations define the representations in the past tense. 
Resentment represents something in the past. This gives us:  
                                                          
8 Note that this sense of fittingness is different from the ones typically employed in the X-first literature. The 
alethic sense of fittingness is neither analysed in terms of reasons nor value, nor is it a sui generis normative 
concept. For discussion of different senses of fittingness, see Howard (2018) and Macnamara (2020) 
9 Shoemaker (2015) shares this framework but argues that we should rather understand blaming emotions in the 
accountability sense as what he calls “agential anger.” 
10 More specifically, he takes the blaming emotions to represent the wrongdoer as having violated “a moral 
requirement of respect”. 
11 Coleman and Sarch (2012: 14) note that this may be way that reactive attitudes accounts of moral 
blameworthiness might attempt to deal with the issue of blameworthiness over time.  
 
Resentment indexed to the past: Resentment represents the blameworthy agent as having 
acted wrongly, with ill will, sufficient control etc. at the time of wrongdoing.  
 
This emotion will be fitting if what the emotion represented is correct: An agent is blameworthy 
if and only she acted wrongly with control, knowledge, insufficient quality of will, etc. at the 
time of action. As a matter of phenomenology, this way of indexing the representational content 
seems plausible. Blame is typically backward-looking, so it seems natural to take its 
representational content to be about the past: about the wrongness of the action and the agent’s 
mental states, at the time of action, or prior to the action. When we blame other people, it is 
directed toward them as they are now, but what we blame them for is typically not about who 
they are now, but rather about what they did in the past.  
An implication of this view is that blameworthiness, like diamonds, is forever.12 On this 
view, resentment represents what happened in the past, and nothing that happens in the present 
can change the past. Resentment will always be fitting, no matter what happens afterwards, 
since the content of this representation will always be correct. Therefore, the agent will always 
be blameworthy. This is a problematic implication of the view. Guilt, atonement, reparation 
and forgiveness seem able to lessen or extinguish one’s blameworthiness. But if resentment is 
indexed to the past, those actions and emotions would not make resentment any less fitting.  
The most principled reply on behalf of Resentment indexed to the past is to maintain 
that resentment is always fitting when its representational content is correct, so the wrongdoer 
would always be blameworthy. We should, however, distinguish between fitting blame and an 
all things considered justification of blame. Although resentment is always fitting, on this view, 
there are often reasons against feeling resentment, and these reasons can gain strength over 
time. These reasons will not bear on the blameworthiness of an agent. In this sense, they are 
reasons of the wrong kind. However, that doesn’t make them any less important when 
considering whether to continue to blame. First, one may perhaps lack the standing to blame. 
Over time, for example in a long relationship, one might have come to commit many of the 
wrongs for which one initially blamed the other. This provides reasons against blaming. Second, 
continued resentment over long stretches of time will often be damaging to our relationships 
and detrimental to our own well-being. This fact gives us both moral and prudential reasons to 
                                                          
12 I borrow this phrase from  Khoury and Matheson(2018).  
let go of blame.13 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the significance of the wrongdoing in 
one’s life will change over time. The reason why we resent someone who wronged us depends 
on many factors: a comment might be hurtful because of one’s vulnerability at a certain point 
in life, or because the role the wrongdoer played in our life at that moment. These things might 
change and this may change one’s reasons to feel resentment, although resentment will 
nevertheless continue to be fitting. Given the prevalence of strong, albeit wrong kinds of reason 
not to feel resentment for wrongs that happened long ago, the proponent of Resentment 
indexed to the past could provide a debunking explanation for why one might think that 
blameworthiness can diminish or disappear over time: Blameworthiness is forever, but our 
(wrong kinds of) reasons for continued blame are not.  
I don’t think this reply is successful. Although many of our reasons to stop blaming do 
not have any bearing on whether an agent remains blameworthy, there are many reasons which 
do. Consider self-blame. As Douglas Portmore has argued, the fact that an agent already has 
blamed herself by feeling guilty seems to matter to whether it is appropriate for her to continue 
blaming herself (2019b:15). Unlike the reasons for ceasing to blame discussed above, the fact 
that you already have blamed yourself does seem to affect your blameworthiness. We can 
illustrate this with a comparative case. Consider two agents who both acted wrongly. Suppose 
that their wrongdoings are similar in all relevant respects. Their actions were equally wrong, 
committed with the same quality of will, knowledge and control. One of the wrongdoer 
experienced guilt for what he did: he was pained by the recognition of his wrongdoing. The 
other wrongdoer did not experience guilt. Although both were equally blameworthy at the time 
of action, it seems, at the very least, that the former wrongdoer is less blameworthy than the 
latter at some later point in time. Yet, according to Resentment indexed to the past, it follows 
that they are equally blameworthy, since by stipulation, they were similar in all relevant aspects 
at the time of action. Similar cases could be constructed where one but not the other wrongdoer 
not only experiences guilt, but also apologize, atones and is forgiven. Intuitively, these kinds of 
actions will make the wrongdoer less blameworthy than he otherwise would have been, but 
Resentment indexed to past has no way of explaining why this should be the case.  
 
4. Resentment Indexed to the Present 
To avoid these problems, a natural solution would be to think that resentment is not indexed to 
the past, but rather to some objectionable quality that the agent displays at the present. Call this 
                                                          
13 For an interesting discussion of letting go of resentment, see Milam and Brunning (2018).  
view Resentment indexed to the present. Recently, Khoury and Matheson (2018) have 
defended this kind of view. The main point of their paper is to show that blameworthiness can 
diminish over time, depending on the wrongdoer’s psychological connectedness to her past self. 
Even though a wrongdoer is psychologically continuous with her past self (through overlapping 
chains of strong psychological connectedness), it does not follow that she now shares any of 
the objectionable psychological features of her past self. It is possible to be psychological 
continuous with one’s past self, but at the same time be psychologically disconnected to it. If 
that is the case, the agent is no longer blameworthy. They illustrate their claim with the example 
of Leon, who drinks from the well of immortality. At the age of 30 Leon commits a terrible 
crime. However, at the age of 530 Leon “is a perfect time-slice psychological twin of your 
favourite moral saint. At 530 Leon shares no distinctive psychological features with Leon 30 
but remain psychologically and biologically continuous with him.” (Khoury and 
Matheson2018: 214).  Khoury and Matheson argue that at 530, Leon is not blameworthy for 
the atrocity he committed when he was 30, because he no longer shares any of the psychological 
features that were essential to his performing the atrocity.    
They rely on the following version of Blameworthiness as fitting resentment: “we 
claim that the intentional content of blame involves the attribution of a flaw to the subject. That 
is, blaming involves thinking or representing the subject to have a flaw. And a necessary 
condition of the subject being a worthy target of blame is the truth of this thought or accuracy 
of this representation” (Khoury and Matheson 2018: 222). It is clear from the context that they 
take resentment to represent the wrongdoer as having a flaw at the moment of blaming. They 
use this account to explain how someone whose psychology changes radically can cease to be 
blameworthy: if the agent no longer displays the flaw, the representational content is no longer 
correct. This means that resentment is no longer fitting, and thus, that the agent is no longer 
blameworthy. This view can better account for the comparative case presented above. This is 
not because guilt or apologies as such lessen the agent’s blameworthiness, but rather because 
guilt and apologies can serve as evidence for the fact that the flaw is gone. 
I think this account suffers from two problems. First, the intuition that guilt or apologies 
may lessen an agent’s blameworthiness is not, it seems to me, best explained by that fact that 
these emotions and actions are evidence for a changed personality. To illustrate, suppose my 
flaw that made me blameworthy in the first place just disappears by accident. In that case, it 
seems to me that the agent would still be blameworthy. Or suppose I take a pill to remove the 
flaw, not in order to become a better person, but – knowing Khoury and Matheson’s theory – 
in order to avoid fitting blame in the future. In this case, my decision to take the blame is 
obviously indicative of some kind of flaw. But the pill works and now I don’t have the flaw 
anymore. Given that resentment on this theory is indexed to the present, it follows that the agent 
is no longer blameworthy. This seems to be the wrong result.  
Second, it also seems that the theory can sometimes make it too hard to avoid blame. 
Suppose you acted wrongly because of some flaw. Afterwards you feel guilt, sincerely try to 
reform, and ask for forgiveness. However, the flaw remains. It does not seem obvious that you 
are still blameworthy (at least to the same extent) for that very action. 
 
5. A Mixed Account 
Both of the accounts of resentment considered so far assumes that resentment has a simple 
representational content. But perhaps resentment is more complex? On Pamela Hieronymi’s 
(2001) view, resentment is constituted by several judgments. Hieronymi’s account is 
particularly relevant for our purposes because it is developed with the aim of explaining how 
forgiveness could be “articulate”. Forgiveness, she argues, requires an overcoming of 
resentment but not every kind of overcoming would count as forgiveness. The fact that 
resentment can be painful, counterproductive or damaging to one’s relationships constitutes 
perfectly good reasons to let go of resentment. But letting go of blame for these reasons is not 
forgiveness. Hieronymi wants to develop an account of forgiveness on which it can, to use the 
terminology I have been employing in this paper, be fitting to stop resenting. The challenge is 
to explain how it could be fitting to overcome blame without excusing the wrongdoer. To be 
blameworthy is to be an appropriate target of blame. David Shoemaker puts the challenge well: 
“how might one appropriately withdraw blaming emotions fitting for someone’s culpable moral 
transgression without also withdrawing the judgment making them fitting, namely that that 
person culpably committed a moral transgression” (forthcoming: 6). Hieronymi’s solution is to 
develop an account of blame on which resentment is constituted by several different judgments. 
In order for me to resent a wrongdoer, she argues, I must make the following three judgments: 
1) the action was wrong; 2) the wrongdoer was blameworthy for the action; 3) I, as the one 
wronged, ought not to be wronged (2001:530). These judgments are necessary but not sufficient 
for resentment. Importantly, Hieronymi also adds a fourth judgment: 4) the past wrong makes 
the false claim that it is acceptable that I am treated this way, and this claim, if left unaddressed, 
poses a threat to me. Resentment, on Hieronymi’s view, is fundamentally a protest against the 
past action that persists as a threat (2001:546). These judgments allow Hieronymi to provide a 
solution to the puzzle of forgiveness. When a wrongdoer sincerely apologizes and repudiates 
his wrong, the fourth judgment is no longer true: the past wrong no longer makes a threatening 
claim. This means that the resentment can fittingly disappear. Moreover, this can happen 
without excusing the wrongdoer, since the first three claims remain true.   
 Hieronymi’s project in that paper is to develop an account of forgiveness and not to 
explain how blameworthiness might change over time. However, we might use some elements 
from her account of resentment in order to address this problem. Hieronymi is offering a mixed 
account of resentment, where some of the constitutive judgments of blame are indexed to the 
past, whereas one is indexed to the present. Judgments 1-3 will always remain fitting. The 
judgment that the wrongdoing constitutes a threatening claim, on the other hand, might change 
depending on the wrongdoer’s repudiation of his action.   
Some tweaking is necessary for this account to work as a theory of blameworthiness. 
The third thought seems superfluous for our purposes. The second thought will not work when 
employed in the Blameworthiness as fitting resentment-framework. If a constitutive thought 
of resentment is that the agent is blameworthy, the account will be circular and non-informative. 
So for the purposes of this paper, let us substitute it with a judgment about the agent’s quality 
of will.  We then get the following mixed account:  
 
Mixed account: Resentment represents the wrongdoer as having a) acted wrongly; b) with a 
bad quality of will; and as making c) a threatening claim.  
 
This account would have several benefits compared to Resentment indexed to the past. Like 
Matheson and Khoury’s account, it can explain how blameworthiness can change over time: 
once the threatening claim is sincerely repudiated, the threat is no longer present and resentment 
is no longer fitting, so the agent is no longer blameworthy. On this view, blame is fundamentally 
a protest against the threating claim. Once this claim is taken back, there is nothing left to protest 
against. Similarly, it can account for the intuition that guilt expressed to the victim through 
atonement and apologies can influence an agent’s blameworthiness. These actions can all be 
seen as ways of repudiating the threat. Moreover, this view avoids some of the problems I raised 
for Resentment indexed to the present.  On the mixed account, it is not sufficient to change 
one’s quality of will or to remove a flaw. It matters how one does it. If one’s psychology 
changed dramatically, either by accident or in an intentional attempt avoid blame in the future, 
without a repudiation of one’s past wrongdoing the agent will still be blameworthy, since the 
threatening claim will remain unaddressed.   
 However, the mixed account faces problems of its own. First, even though expressed 
guilt is one way of repudiating the wrongful claim implicit in one’s action, it seems possible to 
renounce one’s action in ways that do not involve any painful emotions whatsoever. The 
wrongdoer might simply apologize to the victim while calmly explaining that he now 
understands that his action was wrong and promise never to anything like that again. This seems 
sufficient to retract the threat. Of course, the victim might have more confidence in the 
wrongdoer’s sincerity if he also expresses guilt, contrition or remorse for his action. But this 
painful emotion only plays an epistemic role for the mixed account. This leaves the possibility 
of a fully blameworthy agent who ceases be blameworthy without ever being pained by what 
he has done simply because his action no longer constitutes a threat. This strikes me as 
implausible.  
Moreover, even in cases where the wrongful threat is repudiated through sincerely felt 
and expressed guilt and apologies, it is not clear that it is sufficient to render blame 
inappropriate. It seems that agents who have sincerely repudiated their past wrongs might 
nevertheless remain blameworthy. Consider two cases: 
  
Cheating. Tom is married to Mary. He cheats on her. The morning after, Tom experiences a 
pained acknowledgement of what he has done. He feels guilty and apologizes to Mary. 
Nevertheless, upon hearing Tom’s expression of guilt, Mary blames Tom. She will continue to 
blame him for a long time. 
 
Assault. John assaults Jerry. Jerry is traumatized physically and mentally by the ordeal. After 
being apprehended by police, John comes to feel guilty for what he done; he painfully 
acknowledges what he has done. During the trial, he expresses his sincere guilt to Jerry and 
repudiates his action. Nevertheless, Jerry continues to blame John for assaulting him. 
 
As Hannah Tierney (2019) points out, blaming wrongdoers who already experiences and 
expresses their guilt, is in many cases perfectly appropriate. This, Tierney, argues, seems to 
create a problem for Hieronymi’s view. In the cases above, it is not clear in which sense Tom’s 
and John’s actions persist as threats. If resentment is fundamentally a protest against an 
unaddressed threat, how could it be fitting to blame wrongdoers for wrongs which do no longer 
count as threat on Hieronymi’s account? (Tierney 2019: 12). At this point one may appeal to 
the other constitutive judgments of resentment mentioned by Hieronymi. Although the 
judgment about the threatening claim is no longer true, it is still the case that what Tom’s and 
John’s actions are wrong, that they acted with insufficiently good will and that their victims 
ought not be treated as they were. However, the mixed view would need to choose between two 
options. If the truth of the threatening claim is necessary to render the agent blameworthy, it 
seems that Tom and John are no longer blameworthy. If, on the other hand, the truth of these 
other thoughts involved in resentment is sufficient to render the agent blameworthy, even 
without the threatening claim, the view collapses into Resentment indexed to the past. Tom 
and John will be blameworthy forever. But it seems plausible that if they keep on experiencing 
guilt and amend their wrongdoings, they will at some point stop being blameworthy. At the 
very least, they will be less blameworthy than they once were.  
David Shoemaker (forthcoming) develops a view that is in some ways similar to the 
mixed account sketched above. According to him, what he takes to be the paradigmatic blaming 
emotion – agential anger – represents actions or attitudes as slights. The anger is directed 
towards the wrongdoer’s failure to take the victim sufficiently seriously and to properly 
acknowledge him. The action tendency of agential anger is to communicate the anger to the 
wrongdoer, thereby “delivering a request that the slighter emphatically acknowledge what he 
did” (Shoemaker forthcoming: 30). Shoemaker argues that the wrongdoer’s lack of sufficient 
acknowledgment creates a normative disequilibrium between the victim and the wrongdoer. 
Whereas for Hieronymi blame is fundamentally a protest against a persisting threat, Shoemaker 
understands blame as an angry request for acknowledgement.  
This account of the nature of blame also helps explain how blame can cease to be 
fitting.14 When the wrongdoer has emphatically acknowledged the victim, the normative 
equilibrium is restored. This happens, according to Shoemaker when the wrongdoer feels 
remorse. Shoemaker understands remorse as a “painful emotional response to my recognition 
of having caused you a irremediable loss of value, a response which constitutively involves my 
being moved to reflect on (over and over) what I did from your perspective” (Shoemaker 
forthcoming: 11). For a wrongdoer to feel remorse he must take up the victim’s perspective and 
be open to feeling some approximation how the victim felt as result of the wrongdoing. 
Shoemaker thus understands remorse as a painful emphatic acknowledgement.  
Hieronymi takes blame to represent an ongoing threat. This threat disappears when the 
wrongdoer repudiates his action. As a result, blame is no longer fitting. Shoemaker, on the other 
hand, takes blame to represent an ongoing slight: a failure of acknowledgement. On his account, 
the “offender’s emphatic acknowledgement is sufficient to make it the case that the slight is no 
more” [Shoemaker’s italics]. As a result, blame is no longer fitting. It remains true, of course, 
                                                          
14 Shoemaker’s methodological approach in this paper is to start out with an account of what makes anger go away. 
Just as Hieronymi, Shoemaker develops an account of how blame can stop being fitting as a way of explaining the 
puzzle of forgiveness.  
that there was a normative disequilibrium – a slight – so the victim can still view the wrongdoer 
as someone who merited anger. But because the victim has gotten what he requested from the 
wrongdoer – emphatic acknowledgement – the victim no longer has a reason of fit to blame the 
wrongdoer. Hence, the wrongdoer is no longer blameworthy.   
Shoemaker’s account is an improvement on the mixed account. Whereas a repudiation 
need not involve any painful emotion, the emphatic acknowledgement involved in remorse is 
painful. So Shoemaker’s account is not vulnerable to the objection that a mere repudiation of 
one’s action is insufficient to stop being blameworthy. It might seem, however, that Shoemaker 
is vulnerable to the counterexamples concerning serious wrongdoing discussed above. In 
Cheating and Assault it would seem perfectly appropriate for Mary and Jerry to continue to 
blame Tom and John even if they had experienced and expressed remorse for their wrongdoing. 
Here, however, Shoemaker might object that the kind of remorse he has in mind involves 
emphatic acknowledgement: the wrongdoers need to fully appreciate what it is like to be pained 
or damaged by the wrongdoing. For serious wrongdoing, it may take time to fully appreciate 
this.15 Shoemaker might thus argue that the reason why Marry and Jerry still have reasons (of 
fit) to blame Tom and John is that these wrongdoers have not yet fully appreciated the pain they 
caused.  
Nevertheless, I believe that Shoemaker’s account suffers from serious problems. The 
crucial element in Shoemaker’s story is the wrongdoer’s emotional perceptual stance rather 
than the duration and intensity of his painful emotion. If I wronged you, I must take up your 
emotional perspective and come to imagine how it must have felt for you when I treated you 
badly. I will then have experienced a simulacrum of your pain. Once that happens, Shoemaker 
argues, “it looks appropriate for you to abandon hard feelings in favor of forgiveness just as 
soon as you have witnessed (and believed) my own sincere emotional devastation in light of 
what I did. It is, after all, obvious that I clearly and truly get what I did, which looks to be 
enough to disarm your blaming appraisal of me.” (Shoemaker forthcoming 16-17, my italics).  
However, one might appropriately continue to blame a wrongdoer even after it becomes 
obvious that they clearly and truly get what they did. This seems clear in cases of serious 
wrongdoing. The fact that I have taken up your emotional perspective and that I am pained by 
the loss I caused you is one crucial step in a process towards blame becoming inappropriate, 
but it is not its end point. Once I have truly acknowledged the pain I caused you, it will be 
appropriate for me to apologize, try to make up for my wrongdoing, and ask for forgiveness. 
                                                          
15 See Shoemaker’s contribution to this volume, footnote 30.  
These practices make sense in light of the fact that victim’s blame continues to be appropriate. 
But on Shoemaker’s account the blame would cease to be fitting as soon as the wrongdoer truly 
get what they did. Moreover, Shoemaker’s account will also struggle to make sense of the 
appropriateness of self-blame. If it is no longer fitting to blame the wrongdoer, he is no longer 
blameworthy. If the wrongdoer is no longer blameworthy, it would also, presumably, no longer 
be fitting for him to blame himself. But the fact that a wrongdoer has truly acknowledged the 
pain he has caused his victim does not mean that it is appropriate for him to (immediately) stop 
blaming himself. That acknowledgement seems to be the beginning of a process of appropriate 
self-blame. Once this acknowledgement happens, the wrongdoer will typically begin to feel 
guilty, and it seems appropriate to do so, at least for some time.  
   
6. Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt16  
I have argued that accounts of blameworthiness that understand blameworthiness in terms of 
fitting resentment or agential anger will face difficulties in explaining how blameworthiness 
may change over time. Intuitively, there are certain things that a wrongdoer can do or feel that 
will diminish her blameworthiness. She can experience guilt, apologize or make amends. 
Versions of Blameworthiness as fitting resentment struggle to account for this, either because 
resentment is indexed to the past, or because it is indexed to the present. What matters to a 
wrongdoer’s blameworthiness now is not merely her mental state at the time of the action, nor 
her mental state at the present time, but also the moral process she has undergone since the 
wrongdoing in the past. Even accounts, like Hieronymi’s and Shoemaker’s, that aim to capture 
these features struggle to get the details right. Fitting resentment views seem ill suited to capture 
this drama of atonement.  
In this section, I will present an alternative theory. Accounts of blameworthiness tend 
to start with other-directed blame: Agents are blameworthy for x to the extent that it is 
appropriate that others blame them for x. I suggest that we instead build our theory of 
blameworthiness around blaming oneself. To blame oneself is to experience guilt (Wallace 
1994; Clarke 2013).17 Guilt is characterized by its action tendencies, its representational content 
and its affect. The action tendency of guilt is to express the guilt and attempting to repair the 
relationship that has been damaged by the wrongdoing (Baumeister et al. 1994; Haidt 2003; 
                                                          
16 This section summarizes arguments presented more fully in Carlsson (2017) and (2019) 
17 More specifically, to blame oneself in the accountability sense is to experience guilt. I believe that to blame 
oneself in the attributability sense is to experience shame. See Carlsson (2019). For alternative accounts of self-
blame, see McKenna’s, Pereboom’s, and Shoemaker’s contribution to this volume. 
Lazarus 1991; Nichols 2007). I do not want to attempt a full account of the representational 
content of guilt. This strikes me as an extremely difficult empirical question. Answering it 
requires introspection, and there is no guarantee that people will find the same thing when they 
look inside. I think the best we can do is to give a rough gloss. In an earlier paper I suggested 
(following Graham 2014) that the representational content of guilt might simply be that one 
acted with insufficiently good will.18 It now seems to me that one can feel guilty for cases in 
which one does not have an insufficiently good will, for example, for unwitting omissions, or 
for missing a crucial penalty shot. It seems to me now that the most promising gloss on what 
guilt represents might be that one has violated a legitimate normative expectation (Wallace 
1994), or perhaps simply that one has engaged in either a wrongdoing or in a personal betrayal 
(D’Arms and Jacobson this volume).  
 Importantly, guilt is also characterized by its painful affect. When one experiences guilt, 
one is pained by the thought that one has violated a legitimate expectation. The thought does 
not necessitate the unpleasant affect. It is possible to believe that one has violated a legitimate 
expectation without being pained by this thought. But in that case it would not be guilt. In this 
sense, guilt is constituted by its painful affect. This is important and sets guilt apart from other-
directed blame. Unlike resentment and indignation, guilt is necessarily experienced by the 
wrongdoer: the suffering involved in guilt is a necessary part of what it is to blame oneself. This 
suffering comes in different degrees. It can vary from a mild discomfort to a prolonged state of 
agony (Clarke 2013: 155). But if the emotional state does not involve suffering at all, it is not 
guilt.  
An agent is blameworthy, I suggest, to the extent that it is appropriate for her to feel 
guilt for what she has done. What is the relevant notion of appropriateness? I want to argue that 
the relevant notion is desert. Just as we can ask whether pain involved in punishment, sanction 
or harsh treatment is deserved, we can also ask whether the painfulness of guilt is deserved.   
Desert differs from fittingness in several respects.19 First, desert, in contrast to 
fittingness, is a distinctly moral notion, which entails non-instrumental goodness (McKenna 
2012).20 Although some fitting emotional responses, such as grief or gratitude, may be non-
                                                          
18 See Carlsson (2017). 
19 The sense of desert I’m concerned with here is what Feinberg (1970) calls “personal desert.” It differs from the 
sense in which we sometimes say that an artwork deserves admiration or a problem deserves consideration. It 
seems that we can capture the latter sense of desert by using the word “merit.” See Howard (2018) for some 
examples of how merit and personal desert differ.  
20 For an account of desert that neither entails non-instrumental goodness, nor provide pro tanto reasons to bring 
about what is deserved, see Nelkin 2019.  
instrumentally good, non-instrumental goodness is not entailed by fittingness. It can be fitting 
to feel envy or disgust or to be amused by a racist joke, but it is not non-instrumentally good to 
be envious, disgusted or amused by racist jokes. Moreover, whether an agent deserves 
something harmful is a consideration of justice (Feinberg 1970; Clarke 2016). It can be fitting 
to feel regret or grief, but it is not just. Finally, desert is uncontroversially a robustly normative 
notion. The normative status of fittingness in the alethic sense, according to which the 
fittingness of an emotion just consists in the correctness of its representation is less clear cut 
(Tappolet 2011). In general, it is not obvious that we have reasons to have true representations.21 
It is even less obvious that the fact that an emotion would be an accurate representation of some 
evaluative property would be a reason to experience that emotion. It seems doubtful that we 
have any reason to feel schadenfreude, although schadenfreude might be fitting. By contrast, 
the fact that an agent is deserving of something, provides pro tanto reasons to make it the case 
that the agent gets what he deserves. These features of desert help explain why it is prima facie 
permissible to impose deserved harms on people who deserve it. It is prima facie permissible 
to make a wrongdoer experience the guilt he deserves, for example by blaming him. But it is 
not prima facie permissible to impose painful emotions such as grief, embarrassment or regret. 
The reason is that these emotions can be fitting, but they are not deserved (Pereboom 2017; 
Carlsson 2017).   
By substituting resentment with guilt, and fittingness with desert, we get the following 
account of blameworthiness: 
 
Blameworthiness as deserved guilt (DG): An agent S is blameworthy for x if and only if, and 
in virtue of the fact that S deserves to feel guilty for x (Carlsson 2017) 
 
An agent is blameworthy, I propose, because she deserves to feel guilt. Deserving guilt is both 
a necessary and sufficient condition on being blameworthy. DG provides an explanation of how 
blameworthiness relates both to emotions and to harm. Like Blameworthiness as fitting 
resentment, it understands blame as a matter of emotional reactions and not as an overt form 
of treatment.22 This allows for the possibility of private blame. But unlike Blameworthiness as 
fitting resentment, it also makes sense of the thought that being blameworthy involves 
deserved harms or suffering. However, the suffering is of a special kind. When you feel guilt, 
                                                          
21 Although there might be a standing reason against holding false beliefs. For discussion, see Sharadin (2015).  
22 For accounts that understands blame as an overt treatment, see Wallace (1994) and McKenna (2012) 
you suffer in recognizing what you have done. I believe that this captures the specific kind of 
suffering that we take blameworthy agents to deserve. It is not suffering in general, but rather 
the specific pain of acknowledging that you have engaged in wrongdoing or violated a 
legitimate expectation. An agent may suffer as a result of being blamed, without recognizing 
his own fault, simply because he finds criticism unpleasant or because it affects his social 
standing. However, what he really deserves is the pain of guilt; the suffering involved in 
recognizing what he has done.   
 Guilt must thus be fitting in the alethic sense in order to be deserved. It is only when 
what guilt represents is correct that the agent will be deserving of the specific pain involved in 
guilt.23 But although the fittingness of guilt is a necessary condition on blameworthiness, it is 
not sufficient. If an agent acted wrongly or violated a legitimate normative expectation guilt 
will be fitting, but this does not mean that the pain of guilt is deserved. If the agent had an 
excuse, it will neither be noninstrumentally good, nor just that the agent is pained by the 
recognition that he acted wrongly.  
  Another strength of DG is that it can give a straightforward explanation of excuses and 
exemptions. A common way to explain excuses and exemptions is by appealing to the harm of 
blame. When these hostile emotions are expressed, they can be harmful. Because of this 
prospect of pain and hostile treatment, certain control conditions must be met for blame to be 
justified (Wallace 1994; Nelkin 2011, Rosen 2015). The problem with this approach is that 
other - directed blame need not be expressed at all, and even when it is expressed it need not be 
harmful (Nelkin 2013). Self-blame, understood as guilt, by contrast, is necessarily painful. DG 
provides a forceful and straightforward explanation for why control is a necessary requirement 
on moral blameworthiness without identifying blame with any form of overt treatment. To be 
blameworthy is to deserve to feel guilt. To feel guilt is to suffer. But no one deserves to suffer 
for what they cannot control. So no one is blameworthy for they cannot control. Similarly, when 
people act wrongly without having the capacity to recognize moral reasons, or under duress, or 
while being coerced, they are not blameworthy because they do not deserve to experience the 
pain of guilt. The benefits of this way of accounting for excuses and exemptions can be seen by 
comparing it to Blameworthiness as fitting resentment. For such accounts to explain the 
variety of excuses and exemptions, the conditions of blameworthiness would need to be a part 
of, or explained by, the representational content of resentment. The content of resentment could 
not simply be that the agent acted with an insufficient quality of will, nor could it be that she 
                                                          
23 See D’Arms and Jacobson (this volume) as well as Portmore (this volume) for more on this point.  
engaged in wrongdoing or violated a legitimate expectation, for it is possible for those 
representations to be true without the agent being blameworthy. A child might act with an 
insufficient quality of will and someone might be ignorant about the legitimate expectation he 
violated. A conjunction of such conditions would do better However, to capture all of the 
commonly accepted conditions of blameworthiness, such as voluntariness, knowledge and 
control in the representational content of resentment while at the same time maintaining 
psychological plausibility is very difficult. The content would become implausibly complex 
and run the danger of violating what Gideon Rosen (2015) has called the naivety constraint: the 
representational content of guilt must be framed in terms that everyone capable of guilt 
understands. DG avoids the problem by explaining exemptions and excuses not by the content 
of the blaming emotion, but rather by appealing to moral facts about when the pain of guilt is 
deserved.  
 DG also makes sense of a common observation about the nature of blame. Many 
philosophers have recently argued that the communicative aim of blame is to generate guilt or 
remorse in the wrongdoer. According to Miranda Fricker (2016: 173) “[I]n Communicative 
Blame the speech act is geared specifically to bring us to feel the proper pang of remorse, where 
remorse is understood as a cognitively charged moral emotion – a moral perception that delivers 
a pained understanding of the moral wrong we have done.” Macnamara argues “Specifically, 
emotional uptake of the representational content of resentment or indignation by the wrongdoer 
amounts to guilt.” (2015: 559).24 Other philosophers suggest that guilt is the retributive aim of 
blame. As Gideon Rosen notes, “The wrongdoer who responds to outward blame with a sincere 
and cheerful promise to do better next time but without a hint of guilt or remorse palpably 
frustrates a desire implicit in resentment.” (Rosen 2015: 83). Similarly, Susan Wolf (2011) 
argues that the point of angry blame is to get the target of blame “…to experience the painful 
feelings of guilt and remorse” (2011: 338).  
If it is an essential part of the nature of blame that it aims at generating a painful 
emotional state in its recipient, this raises a question of how blame can be justified. DG provides 
a natural justification for this kind of blaming. When wrongdoers deserve to feel guilty, it will 
be prima facie permissible for others to induce guilt in the wrongdoer.25 Moreover, the 
blameworthy wrongdoer cannot reasonably object to the fact that blame generates guilt in him, 
if feeling guilty is what he deserves.26   
                                                          
24 See also Mason (2019).  
25  See Clarke (2013: 158–159), as well as Pereboom (2017) and Carlsson (2017). 
26 However, he could object if blaming lead to other kinds of harms, or to disproportionate guilt.  
 
7. Deserved Guilt and Blameworthiness over Time 
DG has the following implication: If an agent does not deserve to feel guilty, she is not 
blameworthy. This means that if an agent who did deserve to feel guilt, for some reason no 
longer deserves to feel guilty, she is no longer blameworthy. How could one stop deserving 
guilt? One way would be simply by having experienced a certain amount of feeling guilty. To 
be blameworthy, I suggested, is to deserve to feel guilty. However, this claim must be modified. 
As Clarke (2013) has noted, the pain of guilt comes in different degrees and it can last for a 
longer or shorter time. A blameworthy agent deserves to feel guilty to the right degree and for 
the right amount of time. Moreover, as Portmore (2019a) has argued, experiencing a certain 
amount of guilt for a particular wrongdoing will influence how much guilt one deserves to 
experience for that wrongdoing in the future. “After all, one deserves to suffer only so much 
self-reproach for any given wrongdoing” (2019: 62-63). DG thus provides a clear explanation 
for how an agent’s blameworthiness can change over time. A blameworthy agent deserves to 
feel a certain amount of guilt. When she has experienced the right amount of guilt, she has 
gotten what she deserves. It is no longer just and non-instrumentally good that she suffers the 
pain of guilt. Since being blameworthy on DG is to deserve feeling guilt, this means that the 
agent is no longer blameworthy. Moreover, the fact that she already has experienced some but 
not all of the guilt she deserves, makes her less blameworthy than she otherwise would have 
been.  
DG is well equipped to solve the problems I raised for Blameworthiness as fitting 
resentment. First, in contrast to Resentment indexed to the past, it can explain why 
experienced guilt matters to one’s degree of blameworthiness. Recall the two agents whose 
wrongdoings were similar in all relevant respects. One of them experiences guilt afterwards, 
the other does not. DG can explain why the former seems to be less blameworthy than the latter. 
He has gotten more of what he deserved.  
Second, in contrast to Resentment indexed to the present, DG can explain how one 
can cease to be blameworthy without the disappearance of a flaw being either sufficient or 
necessary: agents can remain blameworthy even though they no longer have the flaw. A person 
who simply loses one’s flaw by accident or take a pill in order to remove the flaw so that they 
can avoid appropriate blame in the future will remain blameworthy because he still deserves to 
feel guilty. On the other hand, an agent may cease being blameworthy even though he still has 
the same flaw so long as he has experienced the right amount of guilt.  
Third, in contrast to The mixed account, it can explain how agents can remain being 
blameworthy even though they have experienced guilt and repudiated their wrongdoing so that 
it does not persist as a threat. Tom and John are less blameworthy than they would have been 
without their guilt. But they are nevertheless still blameworthy since they still deserve to feel 
guilty. Their victims would thus have a pro tanto justification for continued blame. Similarly, 
in contrast to Shoemaker’s account, it can also explain why both other-directed and self-directed 
blame can remain appropriate even after the wrongdoer has come to fully acknowledge the pain 
he caused his victim. Emphatic acknowledgement does not settle the issue of whether the 
wrongdoer still deserves to feel guilty.  
DG claims that an agent ceases to be blameworthy as soon as she has experienced the 
right amount of guilt. Is this plausible? DG is compatible with the claim that some agents who 
have committed grievous wrongs will always remain blameworthy. It might very well be the 
case that such agents will continue to deserve guilt for their entire life, and that no amount of 
experienced guilt will equal the guilt they deserve to experience. However, it seems that, at 
least for many kinds of wrongdoing, there are limits to the amount of guilt a wrongdoer 
deserves. When a wrongdoer has experienced the amount of guilt she deserves, she is no longer 
blameworthy. 27 
This raises three important questions for my account. First, does this mean that blame is 
never justified when agent already experiences the guilt they deserve? Hannah Tierney (2019) 
has emphasized that we often continue to blame wrongdoers who feel and express guilt to their 
victims. She argues that this raises a serious worry for my view. DG provides a pro tanto 
justification of blame because blameworthy agents deserve to feel guilty. When people already 
feel the right amount of guilt, this justification will no longer be applicable. Yet, Tierney argues, 
this kind of blame is often perfectly appropriate. She suggests that blame has two different 
characteristic functions. One is to make the wrongdoer feel the appropriate guilt. But another, 
                                                          
27 According to Portmore (2019a; 2019b; 2019c; forthcoming), guilt is constituted by the thought that one 
deserves the unpleasantness of guilt. So, on Portmore’s account, an agent is only blameworthy if guilt is fitting, 
and guilt is only fitting if the wrongdoer deserves the unpleasantness of guilt. It is an elegant package. Since both 
of our views take an agent’s blameworthiness to depend on whether she deserves to feel guilty, Portmore could 
explain how blameworthiness can change over time in exactly the same way as I have outlined in section 7. Why 
not embrace Portmore paper, but I think that we have good reasons to doubt that guilt is in fact constituted by a 
thought about deserved unpleasantness. First, it seems highly unusual that the content of any emotion would be 
constituted by a representation concerning its own justification. It seems more natural that we often have 
independent thoughts about whether our emotional reactions are justified.  Second, it is crucial to Portmore’s 
account that guilt is constituted by a thought about deserved, rather than fitting unpleasantness. But it in order to 
distinguish fittingness from desert Portmore needs to appeal to notions such as non-instrumental goodness. If we 
accept the naivety constraint, the representational content must be framed in terms everybody capable of 
experiencing the emotions understand. I don’t believe that this is the case when guilt is constituted by desert and 
desert in understood in terms of non-instrumental goodness and justice.  
equally important, function is to communicate to the wider community as well as to the 
wrongdoer that the victim possesses self-respect. In expressing blame, the victim, according to 
Tierney, communicates that she should not be treated this way, and that she deserves moral 
attention, care or concern in light of the perpetrator’s behaviour. I believe that Tierney is right 
that blame often serves this function. However, I also believe that DG can allow for this. Blame 
can be justified in many ways. If an agent has already suffered the guilt he deserves, he is no 
longer blameworthy. This provides a pro tanto reason not to generate any more guilt in him. 
However, the importance of communicating self-respect to the wrongdoer and to the wider 
community provides a pro tanto reason to continue blaming. These considerations need to be 
weighed against each other. Moreover, I don’t think that expressing the claim that the victim 
deserves moral attention, care or concern in light of the wrongdoer’s behaviour requires that 
the wrongdoer is blameworthy. It is for example contested whether people are blameworthy for 
their unwitting omissions. Suppose I forgot my wife’s birthday. It may be the case that I don’t 
deserve to feel guilty for this. Nevertheless, it seems quite clear to me that my wife ought not 
to be treated this way, and that she deserves moral attention, care etc. in light of my omission. 
This aspect of blame will often be justified even when the agent is not blameworthy.  
Another worry is that explanation I have given is simply too focused on the wrongdoer’s 
emotions. As I emphasized when criticizing versions of Blameworthiness as fitting 
resentment, it also matters what the wrongdoer does after his wrongdoing. Feeling guilty can 
lessen a wrongdoer’s blameworthiness, but so, intuitively, can apologizing, compensating, and 
various sorts making amends. It would be problematic if these sorts of actions matter to a 
wrongdoer’s level of blameworthiness only to the extent that they served as evidence for her 
feelings of guilt. But DG does not have this implication. According to DG an agent is 
blameworthy to the extent she deserves to feel guilt. Experiencing guilt is one reason why one 
might deserve less guilt, but it is not the only one. Intuitively, the fact that one has apologized, 
atoned, or made amends will also matter to how much guilt one deserves to feel. What a 
blameworthy agent deserves is typically understood as a direct result of the wrongness of her 
action, her mental states at the time of action, her opportunity to avoid what she did, and the 
difficulty of avoiding doing what she did. These features relate to the time of her action. 
However, when we investigate what an agent deserves now, it also seems relevant to ask what 
she has done in the interval between the wrongful action and the present. Plausibly, when one 
acts wrongfully, with knowledge and control, one will not only deserve to feel guilty, but also 
incur certain duties towards one’s victim. These can come in various forms, but at the very least 
it seems that such wrongdoers often will have a duty to apologize, compensate and make 
amends. It seems plausible that an agent will continue to deserve to feel guilty for his wrongful 
action until such duties are fulfilled.  
A similar story might be told about forgiveness. Certain views on forgiveness, which I 
find attractive, argue that in committing a blameworthy wrongdoing a wrongdoer incurs a debt 
to the victim from which the victim might release the wrongdoer by forgiving him (Nelkin 
2013b). One might worry that if my account were correct, forgiveness would play no role in 
releasing the victim from this debt. But this does not follow from my account. At least for 
certain grievous wrongs, it may be that agents will continue to deserve guilt, not only until they 
have experienced a certain amount of guilt, and fulfilled the duties incurred by their 
wrongdoing, but also until they are released by their debts to their victims by being forgiven.   
The final worry concerns fittingness. I have argued that we should understand 
blameworthiness in terms of deserved guilt.  Whether a wrongdoer will continue to deserve to 
feel guilty can change. But, as mentioned in section 6, for guilt to be deserved, it must be fitting 
in the alethic sense, it must be a correct representation. I also argued that guilt’s representational 
content is indexed to the past. It represents the agent has having violated a legitimate normative 
expectation of having engaged either in wrongdoing or personal betrayal. Since it is indexed to 
the past this representation will be true forever. This means that guilt might be fitting although 
the agent no longer deserves to feel guilty, and thus, no longer is blameworthy. This, however, 
is not a problem for my view. As noted in section 6, the fittingness of guilt is necessary but not 
sufficient for blameworthiness The possibility of fitting but non-deserved guilt might perhaps 
have been problematic if fittingness were analysed in terms of reason or value, or if it was 
understood as a generic notion of appropriateness. But this is not the sense of fittingness that I 
have been discussing in the paper. On the alethic sense of fittingness, fittingness is simply a 
matter of correct representations. And the representation that I engaged in wrongdoing or 
violated a legitimate normative expectation is compatible with the fact that I no longer deserve 
to feel the pain of guilt for the wrongdoing, as well as with the fact that I’m no longer 
blameworthy for it. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that accounts that understand blameworthiness in terms of fitting 
resentment will struggle to make sense of how blameworthiness can change over time. It 
matters to an agent’s blameworthiness whether she has experienced guilt, apologized and made 
amends, but these views have difficulties in explaining why this is the case. The solution to the 
problem, I argued, is to adopt a different account of blameworthiness. An agent is blameworthy 
to the extent that she deserves to feel guilty. When she no longer deserves to feel guilty, she is 
no longer blameworthy.28  
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